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Manufacturers' Stocksduring ManufacturingActivity Cycles
In Chapter4 we found that manufacturers'stocks, in theaggre- gate, tended to lagbehind business bya considerablenumber of monthsa rule thatappeared tooperate with impressiveregular- ity in view ofour dependenceupon annual data,In this chapter we shall see whetherthe same behavioris characteristicof stocks during cycles ofactivity in thevarious manufacturingindustries,
iInventories inCurrent Pricesduring Manufacturers'
Sales Cycles
For comparisonwith inventoriesin currentprices, themost appro- priate indicatorof manufacturingactivityseems to be manufac. turers' sales inthe changingprices of theperiod. Sales ofmanu- facturing corporationsare published bycalendaryears in Statistics of Income.1Adjusted for salesby unincorporatedfirms,2 theycan be comparedwith Kuznets'estimates ofyear end inventories (Chart 9), alsobased on Statisticsof Income. Tosupplement these annual estimateswe have the NICBmonthly indexesof the value of manufacturers'shipments andinventories sincei929(Chart to)
In both chartsthe suggestionthat conformityis positive andthat inventories lagbehind sales isvery strong. Kuznets'series reaches a peak at the endof everyyear when saksreach a peak,and the same is true fortroughs. Inthese annualseries inventoriesmove
Before 1922 thefigures are forgross income alone.Since gross incomeand gross sales arevery nearly theSam; gross salesbefore1922could be e,tI- mated fromgross income.
2 Theadjustment is madein thesame way as forinventoriessee App. A. 'The NICBindexes do notincludemanufacturers offood products,tobacco, liquors, petroleum,or certain lumber
products; see Ch.4, Sec. s.
Sthrough one more cycle than sales, but this extra inventory cycle
corresponds to a cycle in the rate of growth of sales and bears the
anie laggingrelation to it as other inventory cycles doto actual












These tendencies characterize the NICB monthly indexes also.
Stocks lag at the two cyclical peaks and troughs that can be identi-
fied between 1929 and the beginning of the war boom. One pos-
sible exception is the behavior of stocks in nondurable goods indus-
tries at the 1929 peak of shipments. Stocks appear to lag but they
may possibly have had an earlier peak, and the value of shipments
of nondurable goods may have reached a peak before 1929.' A
more definite exception occurred at the peak of the war expansion.
The peak in the value of shipments is hard to date in view of the
long period of high but fluctuating shipments. Inventories, how-
4We place the peak of the value of shipments of nondurabks tentatively in
January 1929 because our estimate of the value of their output (based on
the Federal Reserve index of production of nondurable manufactures and
F. C. Mills' index of wholesale prices of nondurable processed goods) reaches
its peak in July 1929. The product of price and output indexes constructed
with different weights is, no doubt, a somewhat irrational compound. But to
identify the 1929 peak in this series it was necessary to discover how the value
of shipments of nondurables behaved before 1929 when the NICB index begins.
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ever, apparently began to decline before shipmentswhich is
hardly unexpected in view of the strained conditions of supply dur-
lug the war.
The absence of monthly indicators of activity incurrent prices
before 1929 makes it necessary to measure the relative timing of
ms in inventories and in business activity by comparing the year
cad estimates of activity with calendar year estimates of sales. We
aasume that calendar year sales approximate the relative levels of
sales on June 30. Thus if inventories reach peaks at the end of the
same year as calendar year sales, we say that inventories lag 6
months behind sales. If inventories reach a peak at the end of the
preceding year, we say that inventories lead sales by 6 months, and
on. In 64 comparisons Kuznets' inventory estimates lagged be-
hind comparable estimates of manufacturers' sales at 6o turns
(Table 26). This proportion is substantially larger than that found
when inventory cycles were compared with monthly reference
turns. Moreover, the average lag seems to have been longer. Manu-
facturers' total holdings lagged 6 months behind saleson the aver-
age. Indeed, according to our crude measures, they appeared to lag
6 months at every turn in sales. The comparable figure for inven-
TABLE 26
Manufacturers' Inventories, Current Prices










Total manufacturing o 8 +6.o
Food, beverages & tobacco o 6 +6.o
Textiles & textile products 3 4 -4-0.9
Leather & leather products 0 5 + 8.o
Rubber & related products o 6 +8o
Lumber & wood products 0 4 +6.o
Paper, printing & publishing o 6 +6.o
Chemicals & allied products i 7 +4.5
Stone, clay & glass products 0 8 + 13.5
Metals & metals products o 6 +8.o
Miscellaneous o 8 + 7.5
Sum of o groups 4 6otories at business cycleturns was only 3.8months. Theaverag( timing of the tenindustry groups alsoindicates longerlags tha was true for comparisonswith referenceturns.
We cannot concludewith any confidence,however, thatmve tories in currentprices actually do tendto lag bchmdsales bya longer intervalthan they do behindbusiness at large,because in the comparisonsof turns in salesand inventoriesthere isa source of error thatwas not present wheninventory turnswere compared with referencedates. Theninventories alonewere representedby annual data. Nowsales as wellas inventoriesare in annualform, The apparentdifference in timing,on the order oftwo months,is not longer thanmight be accountedfor by theinaccuracy with which annualdata maymeasure theaverage timing ofturns in sales.5 No substantialdifference,moreover, appears inthe tinting of theturns of the NICBmonthly indexesof inventorieswhen compared withreference dates andwith the peaksand troughsof shipments. Theaverage lag of theNICB index ofmanufactureri' total inventoriesbehind thereference datesat four businesscycle turns between1929 and i8was 6.5 months.Theaverage lag behind theturns in shipments
was 7 months.5 Iconclude thatwhile inventories incurrent prices tendto lag behindsales, the material now available isnot sufficientlyreliable todetermine whetherthe length of thelag is aboutthe sameas that of inventoriesbehind business atlargethat is, 3-6monthsor somewhatlonger. The regularityof the behaviorof inventoriesin current price during cyclesin sales isindicated bythe conformitymeasures of Table 27. Themeasures areconstructedon a plan identicalwith the NationalBureau standardmeasure of conformityto busineic Assume thatmanufacturers' totalsales turnedin the samemonths as ref- erence cycles,as they may welldo, on theaverage. Assumefurther that the
peaks andtroughs of calendaryear sales run
synchronously withthe calendar year referencedates, as theyactually didfrom x 919to 5938. If wenOW measure the timingof salesat referenceturns from annualsales data by comparing themidpoint of theyears of specificcycle turns withthe monthly reference dates,sales appearedto lead atreference turnsby 1.5 monthson
the averageduring 1919.38.This intervalis about thesame as the timing dif- ference withwhich weare here concerned.
Since 'sales'in thiscontext representthe value ofgoods billed topur
chasers it isscarcely conceivablethat there isa significant differencebetween
turns in sales andin the valueof shipments.
114
CIIAPTLR FiTOTAL INVENTORiES DURING ACTIVITY CYCLES
T*rn27
Manufacture.n' Inventories, Current Prices
Conformity to Sales Cycles, 19I91938*
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4Except misceflaneous. Since an estimate of sales for 1938comparable with
earlier years was not available, the last specific cycle phase thatcould be iden-
tified for this group ends in 1932.
That is, expansions plus contractions; see Table 21, note b.
b A 6-month lag of inventories behind sales is allowed for; that is, end of year
inventories are predated 6 months and their changes measuredduring expan-
sions and contractions in calendar year sales.
cydes except that the reference expansions andcontractions with
which the movements of inventories arematched are marked off
by the turns in the sales of the variousmanufacturing groups. The
lag of inventories behind sales is allowed for bytreating end of year
inventory figures as if they represented calendar yearfigures for
the same year. This amounts to predatinginventories 6 months, an
interval suggested by the timing measures ofTable 26.
The behavior of inventories in currentprices during cycles in
sales seems highly regular. If we allow for a6-month lag, the total
and three of the groups conformedperfectly to both expansions
and contractions. Inventories in two other groupsconformed per-
fectly to full cycles in sales; that is, theyconsistently rose more rap-
TSincc sales run by calendar years, inventories couldbe matched with saks
only by predating them either 6 or z8 months, etc.Other combinations could
be arranged only by the awkward device ofaveraging year end inventories
to get calendar year estimates. Neglectingthis device, it appeared that pre-
dating by 6 months agreed well with thetiming shown in Table6 in all
groups except stone, clay andglass for which it might have beenappropri-







Total manufacturing 7+ zoo+ i oo+ ioo
Food, beverages & tobacco 7 + zoo+o+67
Textiles & textile products 7 +33+50+67
Leather & leather products 7 +33+ 100+ 100
Rubber & related products 7 +33+ 100+ 100
Lumber & wood products 9 + 50 + 20 + 75
Paper, printing & publishing5+ioo+ 100+ 100
Chemicals & allied products 7+ ioo+ 100+ zoo
Stone, clay & glass products 7+100+ o+ 67
Metals & metal products 7 +33+50+67
Miscellaneous 7 ± zoo+ 100+ 100ChAPTER FIVE
idly when saleswere expanding than during neighboringcont. tions in sales. The lowest fullcycle measure is +67,indicating posi..
tive conformity in fiveout of six cycles.8 The relationbetween in- ventories and sales was evidentlymore regular than betweinven. tories and business cycles.
This striking degree ofassociation between cyclesin invento and in sales raises thequestion whether theconnection already observed between businesscycles and the value ofinventories isnot to be traced largely to therelation between inventoriesand manu- facturing activityon the one hand, and to thatbetween matiufac. turing activity and thecongeries of economicfluctuations that make up business cycleson the other. Plausiblearguments may be advanced to the effectthat inventoriesare held primarilyto sup- port the activities ofproduction and distributionrather thanas objects of pricespeculation. Combinedwith the closeand regular connection in time betweenthe turns of businesscycles and those of manufacturigoutput, thesearguments suggest that theconnec. tion betweeninventories andmanufacturing activitymay be the key to theconnection betweeninventories andbusiness cycles. But even a tentativestatement is betterpostponed untilwe have re- viewed the relationbetween inventoriesand manufacturingactiv- ity free from thecommon influence of prices.
2Inventories in ConstantPrices duringOutput Ci'cles
The regularitywith whichinventories incurrent prices follow the movements of dollar salesis doubtlessto be attributed inconsider- able degreeto the influence ofpricemovements on both. To dis- cover the extent towhich theserelations hold whenprices are stable, we examinethe behaviorof inventoriesin constant prices during cycles inmanufacturees' output.aThe inventorydata are
As indicated inTable 27,most industry groupscould be £hscrved during 7 cyclical phases of sales.Seven phases,that is, CX1)arsj0fl5and ConhIction1, make up 6 fullcycles measured bothfrom troughto trough and from peakto peak.
We might haveconipard invcntorjwith sales, bothin constant prices. To do so, howeverdollar sales wouldhave had to becorrected for changes in prices, aprocedu,.subject toerror. In addjtj0we would have had to rely on annualsales data before1929. ft seened betterto substitute output data forPrice.Corn,cted sales data.Physical outputand sales will, ofCourse, diverge wheneverstocks of finishedgoods change, butoutput and sales un-Kuznet' year end estimates in 1929 prices. The output data are
FR.B indexes of manufacturers' output combined into corn-
parable major industry groups.10 Miscellaneous manufacturingwas
oitttd because a comparable index of output was unavailable.
Inventories in constant prices lag behind turns in the output of
manufactured goods just as they do behind reference cycle turns
(Chart ii). Except after 1929 and 1932, when the apparent lag
ii longer, inventoriesreached a peak or trough at the end of each
year in which amonthly peak or trough in output occurs. Again
the impression of positive conformity allowing for a lag of inven-
tories behind output is strong. Our measures for the individual
groups tend toconfirm this impression, though the results are not
as nearlyunequivocal as in preceding comparisons.
Table 28 summarizes our timing measures. In each industry
group the measures arebased on comparisons between the peaks
and troughs of cycles in year end inventories and those of cor-
responding cycles in monthly output. Again inventories held by all
manufacturers and by the individual industry groups appear to
questionably follow very similar paths. And as indicators of output, the
standard Federal Reserve Board indexes of iiianufacturing production arc
available in monthly form for the entire period.
10 following groups were constructed:
Food, Beverages and Tobacco: FRB indexes of manufactured food products,
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products
Paper, Printing and Publishing: FRB indexes of paper and paperproducts
and of printing and publishing
Chemicals and Allied Products: FRB indexes of chemical products andof
petroleum and coal products
Metals and Metal Products: FRB indexes of iron and steel, machinery, trans-
portation equipment, and of nonferrous metals and products
The remaining five indexestextiles and textile products,lumber and
wood products, leather and leather products, rubber andrelated products,
and stone, clay and glass productscorrespond to the inventory groupsof
similar title.
The indexes were combined according to the systemof relative weights
used in the FRB Bulletin for August 1940 and theFederal Reserve index
of Industrial Production, Oct. 1943. The data used here take into account
the 1943 revision of the index.
For 1959-22 additional adjustments were necessaryowing to the omission
of several series. In these cases the level of the seriesrepresenting a major
group before 1923 was raised to the levelof succeeding series by means of
an overlap in 1923.
.
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lag behindoutput as they didbehind referenceturns. Whenwe allow for theomission of themiscellaneousmanufacturinggroup, the number ofcomparisons andthe proportionthat were Iag3arc about thesame as in our studiesof business cyclebehavior. The
Tans28
Manufacturers'Inventories, ConstantPrices Timing at Turnsin Output Cycles,1919-1938
LV. NO. OF TIMES
LEAD (-) INVENTORIES OR LAO (+) LeadLag MONTHS (i) (2)() (ç) Total manufacturing o to +7.8 Food, beverages& tobacco'
+ 6.o Textiles & textileproducts 2 6 4.0 Leather & leatherproduct? 2 g +8,6 Rubber & relatedproducts' 2 2 +2.8 Luniber & woodproducts o 7 + 15.1 Paper, printing &publishing& 0 2 +5.0 Chemicals & alliedproducts' o 3 +11.2 Stone, clay & glassproducts o 8 +15.4 Metals & metalpmducta
7 + 7.8 Sum of9 groups
'Leads or lagslonger than24.5 monthswere excluded. Allcomparisons ex- cluded were lags:foods, leather,paper, and chemicals,eachI;rubber,2.TOTAL INVENTORIES DURING ACTIVITY CYCLES 119
length of the lag also is about the same. Manufacturers'total in-
ventories appeared to lag 7.8 monthson the average behind manu-
facturing output and 8.6 months behind businesscycle turns. The
closeness of the figures is, of course, testimony onlyto the virtual
coincidence of peaks and troughs in total manufacturingproduc-
tion and in business at large. Of somewhatgreater interest is the
fact that the average lags of stocks behindoutput in the various
industry groups are also of about thesame length as when stocks
in constant prices were compared with business cycles.This again
may not argue more than that a certain degree of common associ-
ation exists among business cycles, manufacturingproduction, and
inventories. It is consistent with the hypothesis thatcycles in in-
ventories are determined by those inoutput and that the connec-
tion between business cycles and inventories merelyreflects the
underlying link between inventories and output. As faras we have
yet gone, however, our findings by themselves lend little positive
support to the idea.
The indexes of the conformity of inventories inconstant prices
to cycles in production go little further. Table 29 is preparedon
exactly the same plan as Tables 21 and23 except that the expan-
sions and contractions with which inventoriesare matched are
determined by cycles in the output of the various industries rather
than by the National Bureau standard reference dates. In theupper
portion of the table, the measures allow for the difference in the
relative timing of inventory and output cyclesas revealed in Table
28. Again measurements on something other thana synchronous
basis were made only if average timingwas based on 7 or more
comparisons. Only total manufacturing and5 of the g groups met
this standard. Of these, all except one, textiles, appeared to lag bya
long intervalalmost9 or i 2 monthsand all except one, again
textiles, yielded indexes that imply a fairly high degree of regular-
ity of association between inventories and full cycles in production,
allowing for the indicated lag. For4 of the 9 groups conformity
was measured on a synchronous basis since average timing was
based on too few comparisons to do otherwise. Two groups, paper
and chemicals, yielded zero conformity indexes to full cycles in








Manufacturers'Inventories, ConstantPrices Conformity to OutputCycles, 1919 1938
M*A&UkU 10110W RHOTIMING SUCCUTZOIT TAPu 18
MEMV5ASSUMING * LOrZGLAG OF IHYWNTOIIU
SUIIND OUTPUT
INDIX 01 0N1OI)4fTT
TO OUTPUT Exp.Contr.CcIe (g) (io)(ii) Total manufacturing
Food, beverages& tob.+ 12 7 Textiks & textileprod.+ 12 13 Leather & leatherprod. Rubber & relatedprod.+ 12 8 Lumber & woodprod. Paper, printing& pub.+ 12 5 +10033 0 Chemicals & alliedprod.+ 12 7 + 100 0+33
Stone, clay &glass prod.
Metals & metalprod.
From Table aS,col..Results arerounded to thenearest 3-monthinterval.
bThat is, thenumber ofexpansions pluscontractions in theoutput of the in-
dustrial groupwith which thedirection ofmovement of inventoriesis matched.
The numberdiffers fromgroup to group becausethe groups donot have the
same number ofoutput cycles.
'Inventoriesarc matched
synchronously withoutput because thetiming corn-
pansons were too fewto do otherwise.
+100 50+67 0 14 17
+100 0+100
The irregularor negativeconformity ofthese last fourgroups is less seriouslyat odds withthe hypothesisthat inventoriesconform positively tobusiness activitywith a longlag thanmay appear at first sight.As alreadypointed out,positiveconformity witha long lag maymean invertedbehavior duringa major part ofmany cyclical phases.And thougha paucity ofcyclicalturns makes tuRF ingmeasurement difficult,these seriesmay tend toconform po8i- tively tooutput witha long lag. Ifso, low ornegative indexes
Lead() or 1a (+)
aumedaNo. ofIHDLZ 01
£ON101141fl TOOljlptjf (mu.)PPIU& £xp.Contr.Ctde (I) (s)() (4) (s) (6) Total manufacturing +9 9 +100+6o+ too Food, beverages& tob.
733 5067 Textiles & textilcprod. 14 +14-'4 +8 Leather & leatherprod.+9 so20 + 6o+ 8 Rubber & relatedprod. 8 0--100 Lumber & woodprod. + 12 9 0+ 20+50 Paper, printing& pub. 0' 5 +100 .33 0 Chemicals & alliedprod.o' 7 +3350 0 Stone, clay & glassprod.+ 12 7 + too+ 50+100 Metals & metalprod. +9 tO + 100+ 20 + 78
320
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would be expected if conformity ismeasured on a synchronous
In the lower portion of Table 29 thispossibility is tested. Con-
formity indexes allowing for a i 2-month lagwere prepared for
these four groups and for textiles, whose conformitywas previously
measured allowing for a 3-month lead ofinventories over output.
The results lend support to the general rule thatmanufacturers'
inventories tend to follow production witha long lag. Of the five
groups, three yield positive full cycle indexes, two of whichare
fairly high. The index for paper remainszero. Textiles yielded a
very low negative index. Taking all nine groups together,and al-
lowing for a long lageither9 or 12 monthsthe evidence of
regular association with output is fairly impressive.The full cycle
confonnity indexes of seven groupsare positive, and six indexes
are +50 or higher (seeCh. 3,note 8). The indexes for the twore-
maining groups are of negligible size. As in thecase of their rela-
tion with business cycles, therefore, I concludethat stocks tend to
conform positively with a long lagroughly6-12 monthsto
cycles of manufacturers' output.
3 Some Competing Hypotheses
THE OUTPUT RATE AND MANUFACTURERS' STOCKS
Why do manufacturers' stocks conform positivelyto business cycles
with along lag? Primarily because ofa connection between stocks
and the rate of business activity? Are other factorseither more sig-
nificant or, at any rate, very important? If the level ofmanufactur-
ing activity is a controlling factor, what is thenature of its relation
to stocks?
The fact that stocks move together withoutput as well as with
business cycles, with a long lag in bothcases, does not, of course,
mean that the connection between business cycles and stocks is to
be traced to a connection betweenoutput and stocks. To begin
with, the confonnity indexes of stocks to productioncycles are
only moderately high.This,however, is not conclusive either way.
The suggested connection would,no doubt, be more appealing if
the conformity indexeswere higher. But they do not differ much
from those thatmeasure the association between stocks and busi-
necycles. Moreover, they are from annual data and, aswe know,$
122
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such indexes are usually lower thanthose computedfrommonthi series.
More important is the longinterval by whichstocks lag behind
production. An hypothesis that thelevel of productioncontro,ç the level of stocksmust explain this lag and,as we shall see, the
common theory that links inventories withproduction doeotas- sume a lag in inventories. If thisinvestigationconcentrates on the dependence of stocksupon manufacturing activity,as it it because a plausibleexplanation for the lagcan be found.
The obvious closecorrelation betweenproduction, in theaggre- gate, and business cyclesalso has an importantbearingon the question. This cutstwo ways. Were thecorrelation not close,the behavior of stocks duringbusiness cycles couldscarcely be at- tributed to fluctuationsin production. Onthe other hand, itmight be attributable whollyor substantially to otherfactors a&socijJ with business cycles,and the associationbetween productionand stocks may be entirelyor partly incidental.
Despite the latterpossibility, weconcentrate upon theconnec- tion betweenoutput and stocks.Justification for thiscmpha* of course, must be sought inthe studyas a whole, not in thefindings presented so far. Somepreliminaryargument in support ofour position may, however,prove useful. It takestwo tacks. One is to state, in broadoutline, a theory thatrationalizes the association between output andinventories. Thesecond is to consider the plausibility ofsome alternativehypothcto account for thecy- clical behaviorof stocks.
A COMMONTHEORY ABOUT THERELATION HETWEENOUTPUT AND STOCKS
Businessmen andbusiness observersgenerally think that manufac- turers hold inventoriesprimarily in orderto support theircurrent and immediatelyProspective rate ofproduction and sales. Acor- ollary is thatstocks will varymore or less inproportion to output. As we haveseen, this is the viewKeynes adoptedfor his theory of working capital,which in turnhe took toaccount for the bulk of stocks. It is implicitalso in the'accelerationprinciple' as applied to inventories (Ch.r,Sec. 2).
The theoryhas a plausiblerationale, and laterchapters tend to substantiate it,at least forconsiderableportions of manufacturm'S
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total holdings. The argument rests in part on the fact that a portion
j manufacturers' stocks consists of goods actually in process of
f.J)l%aton. The volume of such stocks obviously depends more or
rigidly upon the rate of production. The quantity of goods in
piocemust bear a relation to the rate of production per week or
with, which is determined by the interval between the time
goods are fed into production and the time they are finished and
ready to be shipped. This interval, in turn, presumably depends
upon the techniqueof production. It varies from industry to in-
dustry, but is probably fairly constant for any given industry dur-
ing a business cycle. The average interval for manufacturing in-
dustries as a whole may, therefore, be assumed to be fairly constant
during a business cycle allowing for changes in the commodity
composition of output (see Ch. 8).
Other portions of manufacturers' stocks not generally consid-
ered to be 'in process' are nevertheless closely tied in volume to the
level of activity; for example, raw materials and finished goods in
transit to their purchasers; purchased materials and supplies that
are being unpacked, sorted, cleaned, stored, and later issued to
fabricating departments; and finished goods made to order and
awaiting shipment. The propositions that are obviously true of
goods undergoing fabrication can apparently be extended to vari-
ous classes of stocks in stages preceding or following actual manipu-
lation.
It is, of course, not clear a priori that goods in these classes make
up the bulk of manufacturers' stocks. But it can be, and oftenis,
argued that manufacturers attempt to maintain a fairly constant
ratio between output or shipments and stocks even though a large
part of their stocks do not consist of commodities whose volume is
tied to output for technical reasons. Manufacturers are said to
keep a stock of purchased materials equal to a certain number of
weeks' supply at their current rate of consumption, partly to as-
sure a smooth flow of materials into production by guarding
against interruptions in deliveries, and partly to allow purchasing
to proceed in an orderly fashion without inmiediate pressure to
satisfy production requirements. Manufacturers are said to follow
the same policy with respect to finished goods in order to provide a
lource from which delivery can be made rapidly to urgent custom-CHAPTER fly
ci's. Good inventory practice is saidto consist in maintaining
such a relation between outputor shipments and stocksas is required to suppott the normalfunctions of productionand selling.Specu- lation is held to bea function of a specializedtrader, not ofa mann. facturer, and descriptionsof good manufacturingpracticecom- monly call formanufacturers to hedge theirinventory risksby fu- ture purchasesor sales when possible andgenerally tomanage their inventories accordingto the requirements oftheir productionand selling activities.
Later chapters willsuggest that this viewof inventorypolicy contains a large elementof truth forsome portion ofmanufactur.. ci's' stocks andsome element of truthfor most oftheir holdings. But it cannot betrue for all their stocks;or at least itcannot be the whole truth. Ifit were, inventorieswould fluctuatemore or less synchronously withoutput. But they lagbehind outputby a con. siderable numberof months. If,therefore, thecommon notion that manufacturers' stocksare held primarilyto serve theconvenience of the fabricationand distributionfunctions is to beretained, the pronounced lagof stocksmust be explained.The solutionis two- fold. Manycommoditiesarc supplied underconditions thatmake it difficult forpurchasers to alterpromptly therate at whichthey receive goods.Goods thatmust be broughtfrom foreigncountries over long distancesor are boughton long termcontract areex- treme examples.But mostmaterials destinedfor fabricationare purchasedsome time beforedelivery and itis dillic nit formanufac- turers to forecastexactly,even 30 days inadvance, therate at which they willconsume raw materials.
Such difficultiesaccount for part ofthe lag. Oneconsiderablecategory of manufacturers' stocksfinishedstaplesappearsto vary inverselyto the rate of output, at leastin cyclicalphases ofshort andmedium length.'1 Thereasons are somewhatobscure:poor forecastingperhaps or, more plausibly,a reluctanceon the part ofmanufacturersto cur- tail operationsuntil theyare certain thatbusiness is fallingoff and a continuingreluctanceeven thento curtailoperations as fully as wouldbe requiredto preventtheaccumulation of stocks and, stillmore, to liquidatethem. Whenthe commoditiesare 11They tendto reverie theirdirection ofmovement andto move together
with outputtoward the endof long phaies.tOTAL INVENTORIES DURING ACTIVITY CYCLES 125
pls, such policies may be persisted in for many months. The
lag of inventories behind output can be explained by a combina-
tion of the two factors: inability to control promptly the rate at
which purchased goods are received and, in the case of staple
goods, reluctance to curtail operations promptly and sufficiently.
All this, however, anticipates the argument and the evidence of
later chapters. Even if strong evidence for this view is finally ad-
duced, it will hardly be conclusive until it has been tested to reveal
the influence of other factors and simultaneous measurement of
their relative importance is attempted. Such simultaneous meas-
urement is not possible, as indicated below, because of the inade-
quacy of the data now available. But it is useful to glance at some
alternative theories to see whether any are plausible rivals for the
post of working hypothesis. We consider two factors as alterna-
tives to the rate of manufacturing activity: variations in interest
rates for their bearing on the cost of carrymg stocks and price
speculation for its bearing on the expected return from holding
inventories.
INTEREST CHARGES AND STOCKS
Though Hawtrey stressed interest charges as a factor influencing
businessmen's desire to hold commodity stocks, he argued that they
would be less likely to affect the calculations of manufacturers than
of wholesalers. Interest charges can account for only a tiny fraction
of the spread between the prices charged by manufacturers for
their products and thc cost of their raw materials. To wholesale
merchants whose markup is small and who operate more largely
on borrowed funds, the cost of credit is perhaps a bigger item. In
any case, the tendency to mininthe its importance to manufactur-
ers seems justified. It may be worth while to consider the matter
more closely.
Without passing judgment on their relative importance, a
manufacturer's chief positive incentives to hold stocks may be
said to be his desire to sustain or increase output and sales and to
profit by successful price speculation. To maintain an output and
rate of sales of $i,000 per month at sales prices, for example, a
manufacturer may have to hold stocks of the same value for, say,
three months. (The average turnover period for manufacturers
between the wars was from two and one-half to three months.)CHAPTER FIVE
At an interest rate of 6 percentper annuma fairly highrate for
customers' loans during the 'twenties and'thirticsthe inte
charge for a 3-month loan of $1,000would be $15or 1.5 percent
This assumes that extra business istypically financed byborrowed moneya common but not predominantpractice. Since theearn. ings of his own funds, ifnot invested in his business,would py. ably net a manufacturer lessthan 6 per centper annum, wemay take 1.5 percent for threemonths to be the maximuminterest co required to carry stocks. Therange of variation in theinterest cost of customers' loansbetween the peaks andtrougha of buj cycles is perhaps20 percent of the peak rate. Theinterest charge for 3-month loans,therefore, mightvary between 1.2percent at the trough and1.5 percent at the peak,a difference altogethertoo small to affecta manufacturer's calculationsabout theprofitability of carrying theadditional stocknecessary to do extrabusiness. The conclusion issimilar whenwe consider the relationbetween interest charges andspeculative incentivesto hold stocks. Inthis instance wemust compare the interestcharge for,say, a month with the expectedrate of price increasethat stimulatesspeculatj purchasing. An interestrate of 6 perccntper annum is only0.5 percent per month. Thedifference betweena low and a high in- terest rate is thedifference between,say, 0.4 and 0.5percent per month. It is quiteinconceivable thatthe monthlyrate of change in prices thatmight stimulatespeculation could beof the same order ofmagnitude. Itseems highly unlikely,therefore, that the influence of interestrate charges couldbe detectedin inventoxy records.'2
The negligibleinfluence ofinterest ratesupon inventory policy was Substantiated bythe well knowninquiry byJ. E. Meade and P. W. S.Andrews (Summaryof Repliesto Questionson Effects of Interest Rates,Oxford EconomicPapers, Oct.1938). None of themanagers interviewedsaid that thecost of borrowedfunds af- fected hiscalculations aboutthe volumeof stocks heshould hold.
12 Theseargumcndo not, ofcour.se, touch themore substantial point that banks may followa more liberal loanpolicy inprosperity than in depression. But there isstill no wayto meajuthe influenceof such changesin loan policy.TOTAL INVENTORIES DURING ACTWITY CYCLES
pRIC3 SPECULATION AND STOCKS
The influence of price speculation upon stocks stands on a quite
different footing. Obviously prices often fluctuate so violently as to
stimulate speculative investment in commodities. And whatever
the commOn opinion about good practice, there can be little doubt
that some manufacturers do on occasion attempt to anticipate
price rises or declines by modifying their inventory policy. The ul-
timate problem, therefore, is to measure the specific influences of
both price speculation and the rate of manufacturing activity.
Unfortunately, the statistical materials at hand are not rich enough
for this purpose. Preliminary consideration, however, may help to
explain our neglect of price speculation in favor of the connection
between output and stocks.
First, the incentives to price speculation do not have any single,
clear, objective index. The most obvious indicator of the strength
of the speculative motive is the rate of change in prices. The ra-
tionale of this index is that a rapid rise causes businessmen to as-
sume a continuation of the rise, and that therapidity of the ex-
pected rise will be proportional to the rapidity of the rise just
perienced. The stocks businessmen will consider it profitable to
hold would, on this argument, be expected to vary with the rate
of rise in prices, with a short lag.'3
In this simple form, the theory is not in accord with experience.
Prices rise most rapidly at the beginning of expansions and reach
a second maximum nearthe peak of business.'4 They usually fall
most rapidly in the second quarter of a contraction.Manufactur-
ers' aggregate stocks, on the contrary, approach their lowestpoint
at the beginning of expansion and do not reachtheir maximum
until the second quarter of contraction, just when prices arefall-
ing most rapidly.
There is, evidently, no obvious regular connection between
13 If a businessman was absolutely sure that prices were going to rise at a
rate rapid enough to cover the cost of carryingstock plus a profit, there
would, of course, be no limit to the inventory he would desire tohold. The
uncertainty that attaches to any forecast, however, limits thespeculative in-
vestment an individual will make in any givencircumstance.
14 These observations are based on a study of the ELS index ofwholesale
prices, 189o- 1938. The rate of change in prices during thevarious stages of
business cycles were calculated according to the NationalBureau procedure
explained in Chapter 3.S
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stocks and the rate of change in prices. Nor is the case improved
if we allow for the rate of manufacturing activity. As we shallsee
in Chapter 6, the ratio of inventories to sales or to output reaches
its maximum at or near the end of contractions when pricesare
low and falling. At the beginning of expansion, just whenprices
are rising most rapidly, the inventory-sales ratio begins to decline,
and continues to fall throughout the expansion, although prices
rise slowly in the middle of expansion and more rapidlytoward
its close. Throughout contractions, prices fall first with increasing
rapidity, then with declining rapidity; the inventory-salesratio,
however, rises throughout.
These observations suggest that price speculation isnot a regu.
Jar influence of great importance. But they donot settle the issue.
A number of other possibilities deserve consideration.
i) Strong as the speculative motivemay be when prices are rising
rapidly, the attempt to accumulate stocksmay not leave its mark
on the statistical series now availablefor tworeasons. The effect
of speculationmay be concealed in the estimates ofmanufactur-
ers' total stocks suchas have been reviewed in this and preceding
chapters because speculativeaccumulation presumablycenters in
stocks of purchased materialsand supplies. Finished goods,that is,
goods ready for sale, will beaffected less, if at all, sincethere will
be an incentive to accumulatethem for speculativepurposes only
when the costs of fabrication,principally wage rates,are charging
rapidly or when the finishedproduct is more easily storedthan the
raw material. More important isthe fact thata period of specu-
lation is likely to bea period of rapidly rising production,sales, and employmentconsequent upon the increasedorders placed with the object ofanticipating a price rise.15As we shall see in Chapterii, stocks of staple finishedgoods tend to move in-
versely to sales andoutput, perhaps offsettingany speculative ac- cumulation of purchasedmaterials. Unfortunately,the few ex- amples of seriesrepresenting manufacturers'holdings of purchased goods are not ofa kind that might revealthe effect of speculative
movements in such goods takenseparately (see Ch.and so)." 15 This is thecourse of tvents whenexpectations are bullish. Whenexpec- tations are bearish,production and salesnaturally tend to fall. iS Sonic of thecommodities, such as cruderubber, raw sugar, andlead come from distant partsand another,newsprint at publishers, isbought on long.
TOTAL INVENTORIES DURING ACTIVITy CYCLES 129
Even if we had adequate records on stocks of purchasedma-
terials, the effects of speculation might not be evident because
manufacturers may not take sufficient account of the effect of
their speculative orders upon output and employment and thusup-
on the demand for their products. Unless, therefore, selling prices
are raised sufficiently to discourage purchasers, larger production
may consume stocks of raw materials about as rapidly as they are
replenished.
2) Some other stimulant to price speculation may be regularly
connected with business cycles. In particular, the strength of the
speculative incentive may depend less upon the rate of change in
prices than upon the interval during which a rise persists. Asus-
tained rise may give manufacturers more confidence in itscon-
tinuation than a shorter period of rapidly vaulting prices. Since
prices tend to rise more or less steadily from about the beginning
to about the end of a business cycle, the incentive to speculation
might be expected to be at a maximum at cyclical peaks. Unfortu-
nately, from the standpoint of causal analysis, production too
is ordinarily at a maximum at cyclical peaks. Thus the influence
exercised by output and sales would merge with that exercised by
speculative considerations.
The most obvious way to try to disentangle the influence of the
two factors is to study the behavior of inventory-sales or inventory-
output ratios during business cycles. The division of inventories by
a comparable measure of manufacturing activity may be presumed
to neutralize the influence of output and sales, and the behavior of
the ratio should then reveal the influence of factors other than out-
term contract. These conditions preclude a prompt response of manufac-
turers' holdings to expected price rises. Iron ore at furnaces moves freely in
recponse to the demand of the fabricators only during summer months. But
more important, the integration of the pig iron and ore producing indus-
tries reduces the incentive of firms making pig iron to profit by speculation
in iron ore.
Raw cotton, silk, and hides arc situated differently. Mills can replenish
their supplies easily from domestic dealers, but there is no assurance that
mill stocks, which are only a portion of aggregate stocks, represent manu-
facturers' total holdings. They certainly do not represent the long position
since mills conunonly hedge their position by future sales. Almost all cot-
toneed stocki are held by oil mills, but the size of the Cotton crop is the
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put, of which speculation may be the strongest. Asalreadymen-
tioned, the ratio, computed for total inventoriesand sales,moves
counter to the direction required by the hypothesisthat thespecu-
lative incentive to inventory accumulationvaries directly withthe duration of a price rise.'
This simple test, we have noted, isrendered partlyinconclusive by the fact that total inventoriesreflect the movementsof both
purchased materials and staplefinished goods whichare likely to offset one anotherto some extent during periodsof risingor falling output such as characterizespeculative episodes.And again the sample of stocks of purchasedmaterials for whichwe have data is not such as to reveal effectsof price speculation.
3) Manufacturersmay not customarily speculateon commodity prices but inventorypolicy is undoubtedlyinfluenced uponocca- sion by speculationfor reasons notregularly connectedwith pros- perity or depression.A speculative episodeof this typewas engen- dered by thedevaluation of thedollar and thepromulgation of NRA codes in thespring andsummer of 1933. Anotherexample is thewave stimulated by thescarcity of goodsafter both world wars. Although suchepisodes arenot a regularpart of busine cycles, they deservestudy in theirown right.18
The foregoingconsiderationsare inconclusive.They establish a strong presumptionthat variationsin interestrates do not influ- ence inventorymovements greatlyand theyindicate that price speculation isnot such animportant featureof manufacturers' actions duringbusiness cyclesas to leave itsstamp clearlyon aggre- gate inventories.But thematter is far fromsettled. Indeed,as we
This assumthat price cyclesconform closelyto business cycleswithout appreciable leador lagan assumption
consistent withrxpericnce. ' For whatit is worth,it is interestingto notice thatin the two violrnt speculative episodescovered byour data,1919-2i and mid-i933, ratios of manufacturers'aggregate inventoriesto aggregate saltsdo not indicate that inventorieswere especially highrelative tomanufacturing activity(see Cli.
6, Sec.2).The evidence,however,may misrepresentthe facts, becauseac- cumulation ofpurchasedmaterials is offsetby liquidationof finished goods. Inventory-salesratios fordepartmentstores clearlyreflect the effects of speculation atleast in the1919-20episode. Departmentstores, however,
may be better ablethanmanufacturersgenerally toadjust the rateathieh
they purchaseand receivegoods to thedemands ofa speculative inventory
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w, there are reasons for thinking that the kind of evidencethis
study can bring to bear cannot be sufficientto settle it.
With this in mind, we proceedon the tentative assumptions that
price speculation is not a major factorregularly affecting varia-
tions in manufacturers' inventories duringbusiness cycles, that it
may be neglected in seeking a first approximation toan explan-
ation of inventory movements, and that it willbe illuminating to
concentrate attention on the relations between stocksand produc-
tion or sales. The validity of this procedure isnot, of course, founded
solely on the facts and argumentsso far considered. It is based
upon a review of all the materials available. Its soundness, there-
fore, can be better judged at the end of this book.But though sup-
port for this view will then be stronger, it willnot be conclusive.
Nor can a definite conclusion be reached untilthe data are suffi-
ciently improved in detail and frequencyso that something like a
separate measure of the specific effects of manufacturingactivity
and price speculation becomes feasible.
S